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Abstract 
In New Zealand, there have been signs that Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) may be 
employed in expanding the roading network in order to meet future developing needs. This 
paper examines the lessons from international experiences and the potential of PPP initiatives 
in developing roading projects in New Zealand in order to contribute to the scientific and 
technical discussion. Potential issues in the implementation of PPP initiatives focusing in New 
Zealand context are identified. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There has been a growing tendency in involving the private sector in providing high-standard 
transport infrastructure to meet the needs of rapid economic growth. For many years, the public 
sector has traditionally financed and operated infrastructure projects using resources from taxes 
and various levies (e.g. fuel taxes, road user charges). However, the recent disparity between 
the capacity to generate resources and the demand for new facilities has forced governments to 
look for new funding methods and sources. Many countries are now contemplating Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP) as an arrangement between public and private sectors to finance, 
design, build, operate and maintain public infrastructure, community facilities and related 
services. 
 
Despite widely acknowledged benefits associated to PPP, international experiences have 
shown that there can be many issues affecting the successful implementation of these 
partnerships. It has been argued that a properly structured PPP can efficiently achieve better 
results than public sector initiatives.  It is often claimed the private sector, with its wide range of 
managerial, commercial, and technical skills, can reputedly perform certain tasks more 
efficiently than the government, thereby offering potentially huge benefits to the public (Zhang 
et al., 2001). Despite avowed advantages, recent international experiences of PPP programmes 
have shown that extensive planning actions are required in order to guarantee the minimum 
level of risk (World Bank, 1999; Fisher and Babbar, 1996; Menckhoff and Zegras, 1999; Shaw 
et al., 1996).  
 
This paper intends to contribute to the technical discussion about PPP planning and 
implementation in the New Zealand context. A review on recent international experiences is 
presented in order to identify potential issues, challenges, barriers and lessons that may 
contribute to developing PPP roading projects in New Zealand. The paper is divided into four 
sections, namely: critical analysis of world wide PPP initiatives in roading projects; New 
Zealand context and PPP; of PPP initiatives focusing in New Zealand context and conclusions 
and recommendations for further studies. 
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 In New Zealand, there have been signs that PPP may be employed in expanding the roading 
network. Land Transport New Zealand, Transit and the Ministry of Transport have 
demonstrated interest on the theme. Various preliminary reports (Wallis, 2005; MOT, 2002; 
Transit 2003a; 2003b) have been prepared in order to create knowledge and instigate discussion 
about PPP policies for funding infrastructure projects. The main focus of these reports has been 
on: policy development; guidelines for funding; traffic forecast and economic analysis.  
 
 
2. Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
PPP is significantly distinct from traditional design- bid - build contracts. Many fundamental 
issues can be highlighted such as: a broad range of uncertainties and risks associated with the 
long-term PPP contract; radical realignment of risks, responsibilities, and rewards among 
multiple project participants; the private-sector partner undertakes far more responsibilities and 
assumes much more and deeper risks than a mere contractor. Also, PPP usually involve limited 
resources and off-balance transactions, as well as complicated contractual arrangements 
between project participants. 
  
Various PPP definitions can be found in the literature (Allan, 1999). The two most commonly 
used definitions are:  
• a cooperative between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each 
partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of 
resources, risks and rewards; and / or 
• An arrangement between two or more entities that enables them to work cooperatively 
towards shared or compatible objectives and in which there is some degree of shared 
authority and responsibility, joint investment of resources, shared risk taking and mutual 
benefit.  
 
Historically, PPP have been observed since nineteenth century. At that time, railways, canals, 
roads, and gas, power, and water systems were initially privately owned, operated, and funded. 
However, over the years, infrastructure companies were regulated or nationalized, although the 
pattern varied substantially across and within countries and sectors. Wars and economic 
depression gave another boost to nationalization and stronger regulation, which increased in the 
1940s and 1950s. Disappointment with the performance of regulated or nationalized firms led 
again to deregulation and privatization in many countries from the 1970’s onward (Klein and 
Roger, 1994). 
 
Following the evolution of the PPP in infrastructure, the forms of contracts have also changed 
depending on: degree of risk allocated between the partners; amount of expertise required on 
the part of each partner to negotiate contracts; and potential implications for ratepayers. Thus, 
currently PPP have been undertaken with a combination of the following functions: design; 
build; finance; operate; maintain; own; transfer; lease; develop; and buy. It is also referred as 
different type of arrangements such as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), although the actual 
delivery mechanism includes Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM), 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Build-Own-Operate (BOO) and 
Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (ROT) (Menckhoff and Zegras 1999; Zhang 2001).  
 
The level of risk of each PPP type can be determined as shown in Figure 1. It is observed that 
when decisions regarding the choice of PPP model as we move towards total decrease of public 
sector involvement, more risk is transferred to the private sector and vice versa. For example, in 
the Operation and Maintenance model the risk involves mainly public investments. On the 
 
 other hand, in the Concession model, risk is mostly transferred to the private sector and its 
investments.  
 
Degree of Risk 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
D
es
ig
n-
B
ui
ld
 
B
ui
ld
-tr
an
sf
er
-O
pe
ra
Le
as
e-
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
B
ui
ld
-O
w
n-
op
er
at
e-
tra
ns
fe
r 
Le
as
e-
de
ve
lo
p-
op
er
a
C
on
ce
ss
io
ns
 
High 
Private  
Public 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Risk Degrees in PPP 
Source: Adapted from Chege and Rwelamila (2001) and Guislain and Kerf (1995) 
 
Various researches have been conducted in order to foresee and / or diminish issues in PPP 
Programmes. For example, the World Bank (1999) and Shaw et al. (1996) have identified the 
following key issues to implement PPP programmes: (1) Planning and institutional issues; 
(2) Legal and regulatory framework; (3) Types of contracts; (4) Government Support; (5) 
Traffic Forecasting; (6) Setting and adjusting toll rates; (7) Financing structure and 
sources; (8) Public acceptance; and (9) Role of donor agencies. These elements can help to 
establish a prosperous environment for PPP programme. It is important that government and 
private sectors know their role, benefits, investments, risks, guarantees, etc when participating 
in a PPP programme. Thus, issues that may appear in future will be easier to solve. 
 
 
3. PPP programmes around the world 
Different types of PPP have been put in practice in worldwide infrastructure development. 
Limited financial resources available to the public sector for financing infrastructure 
development have prompted countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and North, Central and South 
America to use private investment as a promising alternative. As noticed by World Bank (2002), 
there have been 662 transport projects with private participation that attracted US$135 billion 
in investment during 1990 to 2001. Table 1 summarizes the biggest PPP projects, some social 
characteristics and the degree of the private sector involvement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1- Transportation PPP projects worldwide 
Country 
Total length of toll 
roads in operation 
(km) 
GDP per Capita 
(US$) 1997 
Autos per 1,000 pop. 
(1997) 
Extent of Private 
Sector 
Involvement 
Argentina 197 9,700 151 Moderate 
Brazil 856 6,300 67 High 
Chile 3 11,600 109 Moderate 
China 4,735 3,460 8 High 
Colombia 1,330 6,200 38 High 
France 6,716 22,700 521 High 
Hong Kong 68 26,800 74 High 
Hungary 254 7,400 272 Moderate 
Indonesia 472 4,600 21 High 
Italy 6,440 21,500 679 High 
Malaysia 1,127 11,100 152 High 
Mexico 6,061 7,700 133 High 
Philippines 168 3,200 12 High 
Spain 2,255 16,400 457 High 
Thailand 91 8,800 105 Moderate 
United Kingdom 8 21,200 406 High 
United States 7,363 30,200 760 Low 
 
Various lessons can be taken from these PPP initiatives (World Bank, 1999; World Bank, 2002; 
Harris, 2003). They are:  
• Argentina: The toll road concession program transferred to private operators 
one-third of the intercity road system and the vast majority of the access roads to Buenos 
Aires. Major issues were: complex bidding criteria and rules for contract renegotiations; 
term of concession periods; negative public response; the need for a well-defined legal and 
regulatory regime; and the importance of institutions; 
• Brazil: Over 850 km transferred to private sector, which is expected to invest over 
US$1.1 billion in the next 25 years. Major issues were: the role of multilateral development 
banks, particularly in providing long-term financing; the use of cross-subsidies to fund 
unprofitable toll roads; use of relatively low toll rates to foster public acceptance; and 
vulnerability to economic crisis; 
• Chile: Enacted a law allowing for the award of concessions for the construction, 
maintenance, and operation of toll roads, tunnels, and related infrastructure under BOT 
schemes, which intend to attract U$4 billion from 1997 to 2000. Major issues were: 
focusing goals on the development of adequate road infrastructure at the lowest possible 
costs and greatest efficiency, avoiding goals irrelevant to these considerations; transparent 
and competitive bidding procedures, with the terms of the contract clear and equal for all 
participants, leaving as little as possible to future negotiations; preparation of basic 
information (e.g., traffic estimate for the base year, basic engineering, basic design, soil 
studies) by the government; endeavouring to keep tolls at levels that users are willing to pay; 
and reducing construction risk, with the government giving bidders reference designs; 
• Colombia: Called for about US$1.2 billion in private investment for the 1995-1998 
period in order to rehabilitate 1,080 km and construction of 250 km of new road. Major 
issues were: use of a private-public sector partnership to bring additional resources to the 
project and increase efficiency; use of competitive bidding to minimize governmental 
support and residual risk; need to base project revenues on affordable toll rates; benefits of 
providing an up-front capital contribution rather than an operational subsidy; benefits of 
 
 including existing tolled facilities in the concession package; need to allow concessionaires 
to take a position in the project’s future upside revenue; importance of quality project 
preparation; and helpful role played by an international development bank, such as The 
World Bank; 
• China: Estimates of over 70 percent increase in traffic forecasts in the 1994-2000 has 
triggered the construction of 130,000 km of new roads by 2000, which requires over US$150 
billion investments. Although there remains a substantial shortfall in the financing available 
for implementation, China has been laying the foundation for substantial and long-lasting 
private sector participation. Major issues were: leveraging of existing highway assets to 
raise new funds in capital markets;  need for a legal and regulatory environment conducive 
to private financing for new toll highways;  need for adequate institutional capacity and 
compensation for land acquisition and resettlement; creditworthiness and commitments 
from public entities;  need for flexible forms of project companies in order to facilitate 
foreign investment; and need for transparent contracting procedures; 
• France: The development of high-performance roads in France may be divided into 
four phases. In the first phase, from 1955-69, France made a commitment to the use of tolls 
for financing motorway construction by public companies. The second phase, one of 
liberalization and privatization, lasted from 1969 to 1981. The third phase, from 1982 to 
1993, involved crisis management through a state takeover and a national system of 
cross-subsidies. The current phase, commencing in 1993, is one of planning agreements and 
consolidation within the public sector. Major issues were: relative advantages and 
disadvantages of motorway financing through cross subsidies; relative advantages and 
disadvantages of toll financing of highways; efficiency of private concessions for highways; 
dilemma of regulating toll rates of concessionaires; importance of guarding against potential 
conflicts of interest when construction companies participate in concessions; and relative 
ability of public and private sector companies to take environmental considerations into 
account; 
• Hong Kong: despite a lack of public funding, motives for introducing BOT were not 
the primary concern. Main motivations were:  introduce innovative technology; build up 
needed infrastructure more rapidly than would have been possible using conventional 
methods; build and operate infrastructure in a more efficient manner than it was thought that 
the public sector alone would be able to do; and retain public funds for needs that might arise 
after Hong Kong reverted to the People’s Republic of China. Major issues were: 
 identification of BOT projects based on a long-term plan; and clear risk-sharing based 
legislative ordinances enacted for each project;  transparent tendering and selection 
procedures; independent monitoring of the tender process; the importance of allowing the 
private sector maximum flexibility in route selection and design, addressing revenue risks 
through firm and fair toll adjustment mechanisms; concession expiration and “re-bidding”; 
maintaining the flexibility to utilize such tools as development rights to supplement project 
economics; and the importance of using experienced contractors for technologically 
sophisticated projects; 
• Hungary: initially developed a toll motorway network on a BOT basis, which called 
for the development of four motorway corridors. Major issues were: need for reliable traffic 
forecasts; importance of public acceptance; importance of well-drafted concession laws; 
appropriateness of Government contributions of rights-of-way; potential conflicts of interest 
in contractor-driven projects; role of multilateral bank support; and transition toward PPP; 
• Italy: a toll motorway has been developed through granting concessions, almost 
entirely to companies controlled by public bodies. There are about 28 toll motorway 
concessionaires (1993), with 27 of these being semi-public companies. Major issues were: 
the creation of a financially strong toll road operator; the importance of winning public 
 
 acceptance for toll increases; the limited use of direct government subsidies; the use of 
special accounts to provide financial support for financially weak concessionaires; and the 
use of a price-cap scheme for toll increases; and 
• United Kingdom: due to legal restrictions and strong public resistance, direct 
assessment of tolls has thus far only been used for very short road links, such as bridges and 
tunnels through Design-Build-Finance- Operate (DBFO) mechanism. The concessionaire 
typically provides the facility and the services to the Government in return for “shadow 
tolls” that are based on highway usage and the availability of the facility. Major issues were: 
appropriate sharing of revenue risks; the compatibility between appropriate profit levels and 
effective incentives for the private sector; the appropriate scope and procedures for 
government review of private sector projects; the monitoring of project activities through a 
public inquiry and/or independent committee process; the importance of using an 
experienced contractor; and innovative financing in a mature financial environment. 
 
 
4. New Zealand context and PPP issues 
Historically, investment in the New Zealand transport system has been heavily dependent on 
government funding. Recently, however, it has been argued that investment through the 
National Land Transport Fund (NLTF) and territorial authorities is insufficient to address 
changes in transport demand and the strategic needs of New Zealand. Hence, there have been 
signs that PPP may be employed in expanding the roading network in order to meet future 
developing needs.  
 
Governmental agencies such as Ministry of Transport, Land Transport New Zealand (LTNZ) 
and Transit New Zealand have demonstrated interested on the theme. These agencies have 
prepared reports in order to create knowledge on how they can benefit from private investment 
to. A few initiates have already been done towards the PPP direction  
 
In 2002, the Ministry of Transport established the Land Transport Management Bill, which 
represented the biggest legislative change since the late 1980’s. The Bill provides for a 
balanced and flexible funding framework for land transport. The Bill places a number of 
conditions on PPPs including: 
• Partnership arrangements are limited to 35 years or less; 
• Land transport infrastructure remains in public ownership; 
• Initial acquisition of land, and designation of land for roading, remains with the public 
sector; 
• The public sector is not liable to compensate any party if traffic numbers are below 
forecast for the life of the project; 
• The project has a high degree of support from affected communities; 
• The final proposal needs ministerial approval; and 
• PPP will usually, but not always, involve tolls. The bill provides a generic framework 
for tolling projects, which until now have required a separate piece of legislation for each 
project. 
 
Under the Bill, Transit New Zealand has developed two major reports: Alternative Methods of 
Funding Future State Highway Projects and Finance; and Toll projects-Implementation Guide. 
The guidelines are aimed to provide guidance for implementing alternatively funded State 
Highway projects using PPP (concession) agreements. The reports provide a step-by-step 
process in the implementation of candidate projects through an alternative funding method 
(Transit NZ, 2003a; 2003b).  
 
 In addition, more recently LTNZ has funded a research report examined the implications of 
road tolling policies for New Zealand. Despite the report focus only on toll roads financed 
mainly by government investments and resources, the results reached in the report are 
applicable for PPP schemes. The report identified main areas of deficiency in tolling road 
specially the assumptions using to modelling the traffic and economic evaluation.  
 
 
5. Learning from the Experience 
Overall, all experiences analyzed in this report demonstrated that PPP scheme has to be 
carefully applied. Success and failures of these partnerships have shown that one of the main 
issues associated with PPP are the assumptions and estimations conducted during the planning 
process. Clearly these assumptions and estimates may reflect on the risk of PPP projects. 
Amongst them, it can be highlighted:  
• Variations in exchange rate; 
• Expected growth in traffic demand; 
• Political tensions and changes in policies; and 
• Renegotiations of contracts.  
 
PPP projects in Southeast Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, have failed mainly because 
of the high risk and fewer guaranties on the investment return. In these countries, public 
agencies have inaccurately estimated costs and traffic forecasts, which interfere in the private 
finance hesitance. Inability to assess local conditions and the lack of confidence to guarantee 
the long-term investment return has created huge problems for those countries. 
 
On the other hand, other experiences such as in the United Kingdom, France, Colombia and 
Brazil draw the attention to three main critical aspects on the planning and implementation of 
PPP’s. Firstly, it is important to have simple and transparent criteria for the projects. Secondly, 
the rules for renegotiating contracts should be spelled out as early and as clearly as possible. 
The third aspect is the whole planning and implementation process of PPP projects. The 
planning, design, maintenance, and construction phases are the responsibility of the 
government, but the investment comes from the private section. Therefore, it is crucial that the 
public sector realizes it role and the importance of its strategic actions in order to offer a reliable 
and safe service to users.  
 
Therefore, if the New Zealand government decides to move forward with the introduction of 
PPP schemes, a comprehensive program should be established to guarantee the successful 
attainment of the Land Transport Strategy’s objectives. Based on the international experiences, 
the program should be based on long-term planning that provides indicates stability in actions 
and commitment to minimize risk levels, which are likely to attract private companies. On the 
other hand, the selection of transport infrastructure projects should be carefully analysed to 
avoid the various pitfalls that have plagued PPP schemes all over the globe. Specifically, there 
should be serious consideration on which projects would really contribute to achieve “an 
integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable land transport system”. In various countries, there 
has been a tendency to focus in providing additional transport infrastructure where there is 
already a great deal of demand saturation, which is obviously a considerable attractive factor 
for financial return. Nevertheless, this may be counterproductive in terms of achieving travel 
demand management objectives, i.e., efficient utilization of available resources using policy 
instruments.  
 
Building from these principles, there would be a need for methods and tools that could 
 
 specifically support the analysis and evaluation of PPP projects. Traditionally, the assessment of 
transport projects has mostly been based on economic appraisal as in the LTNZ Project Evaluation 
Manual, which mainly considers travel costs and the revenues of direct investments and maximizing the 
net benefits in resource terms (Willis et al., 1998; Lee, 2000). Nevertheless, in a PPP environment the 
necessity of analysis of not only operation but also social, political and economical criteria has become an 
essential factor for success of any PPP project (Dantas et al. 2006). The World Bank (1999) reports that 
factors such as land use, population and economical growth surrounding the asset influence directly and 
indirectly the structure of the PPP project. Therefore, the use of cost benefits analysis should be applied as 
one of many steps to evaluate PPP project but not the only one.  
 
Thus, the availability of PPP-oriented methods and tools would contribute to other key areas 
such as financial, risk and law issues. They would contribute to produce more realistic 
assumptions and estimates to cost benefit analysis and consequently to decrease the risk and 
increase the changes of financial success of the PPP projects.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper reviewed on worldwide experiences and examined the potential and issues that may 
be faced in adopting PPP in New Zealand. Previous experiences show that there is significant 
potential in attracting investment from the private sector, but successful PPP profoundly 
depends on planning actions prior to implementation. A key lesson to New Zealand would be 
that PPP should be carefully planned and presented based upon simple, transparent and 
strategic principles. In this sense, there is a growing realization that further research is needed in 
order to develop tools and methods that could accurately analyse the complex reality of PPP 
projects.  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors want to express their gratitude to Transit NZ staff for providing access to documentation that contributed to this 
paper.  
 
References 
Allan, J. R. (1999) Public –Private Partnerships: A Review of Literature and Practice. 
Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, Public Policy paper n.4.  
Chege, L., Rwelamila, P.D. (2001) Private Financing of Construction Projects and 
Procurement Systems: An integrated Approach. CIB World Building Congress. Wellington, 
New Zealand.  
Dantas, A. Ribeiro, K. (2006) Assessing Spatial-Temporal Impacts of a Transport 
Infrastructure Policy in Brazil. Transportation Research Board.  
Fisher, G., Babbar, S. (1996) Private Financing of Toll Roads. RMC Discussion paper series 
117. World Bank. Washington DC. 
Guislain, P., Kerf, M. (1995) Concessions- The way to Privatize Infrastructure Sector 
Monopolies. Private Sector note n. 59. 
Harris, C. (2003) Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries. Trends, 
impacts and Policy Lessons. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Klein, M., Roger, N. (1994) Back to the future- The potential in infrastructure privatization. 
World bank, Private Sector no: 30. 
Menckhoff G, Zegras C. (1999) Experiences and issues in urban transport infrastructure 
concessions. Proceeding of International Road Federation (IRF) Symposium. Hanoi, 
Vietnam. 
MOT- Ministry of Transport (2002) Land Transport Management Bill. Ministry of Transport, 
 
 Wellington, New Zealand. 
Shaw, N., Kenneth, M. G. and Lou, T. (1996) Concessions in Transport. TWU-27, TWUTD, 
World Bank, Washington, USA. 
Transit NZ (2003a) Alternative methods of funding future State Highway projects. Draft 
Report. 
Transit NZ (2003b) Finance and toll projects- Implementation Guide. Draft Report, Wellington, 
New Zealand.  
Wallis, I. (2005) Implications of selected urban road tolling policies for New Zealand. Land 
Transport New Zealand Research Report no. 270; New Zealand. 
Willis, K. G., G. D. G. and H. D. R. (1998) A Review of Cost- Benefit Analysis as Applied to the 
Evaluation of New Road Proposals in the U.K. Transportation Research, vol. 3, n.3, pp. 
141-156. 
World Bank (1999) Asian Toll Road Development Program. Review of recent toll road 
experience in selected countries and preliminary tool kit for toll road development. World 
Bank and Ministry of Construction of Japan Draft Final Report. Washington, DC. 
Zhang, X. Q., K. M. M. (2001) Procurement Protocols for Public Private Partnered Projects. 
Journal of construction Engineering and management, ASCE, vol. 127, n. 5, pp 351-358. 
World Bank (2002) Private participation in Infrastructure: Trends in developing countries in 
1990-2001. World Bank, Washington, USA. 
 
